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Abstract—. One of the main challenges facing the electricity 
sector worldwide is the design of efficient markets. In particular, 
the mechanisms used to solve regulatory conflicts are a crucial 
element of a regulatory regime and a major determinant of the 
risks borne by private investors. We use the Chilean experience 
to analyze the evolution of mechanisms for conflict resolution 
within the electricity sector. We propose a theoretical framework 
based on bargaining theory to explain the behavior of market 
agents. This methodological approach is used to explain the 
evolution of conflict resolution following the introduction of the 
Experts Panel in 2004, as well as to explain the reduction in the 
number of conflicts. The results can also be applied to other 
electricity markets, leading to future market design proposals 
and governance improvements. 
 
 Keywords—Market design, conflict resolution, Experts Panel, 
bargaining, game theory. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
ompetitive electricity markets need effective market 
design solutions. In this context several key aspects such 
as the definition of private/public information, the 
rights/duties of the market agents, the operation/planning 
criteria, and the remuneration of ancillary services, among 
others, should be taken into account by the sector legislation, 
by-laws, norms, and standards [1, 2]. These definitions should 
also include the mechanisms for conflict resolution in the case 
of different interpretations of the regulatory framework by the 
market agents or by the regulator. In this context, the 
experience of diverse market design solutions can help in the 
understanding of agents’ behavior and of market robustness.  
 
One of the puzzling features of the Chilean electricity sector is 
that the introduction in year 2004 of a new institution for the 
resolution of conflicts, the Experts Panel, led to a marked 





This decline in the number of disputes has taken 
place even under conditions of great stress in the system due 
to abnormally high marginal prices that led to large transfers 
between companies [4].  
 
Consequently, important questions arise: Why did the change 
in the mechanism of conflict resolution reduce so drastically 
the number of disputes? Which specific features of the new 
scheme determine the observed evolution? The answer to 
these questions can provide a basis for the development of 
specific market design proposals. 
 
                                                           
1 Another source of disputes are those between the regulator and private 
firms (power generating, distribution and transmission firms), which have not 
declined. The difference is due, first, to the fact that many of the conflicts with 
the regulator are part of the regulatory process and second, because conflicts 
with the regulator are subject to political economy incentives. 
This paper seeks to analyze the effects of different systems of 
conflict resolution, on the basis of the experience in Chile 
during the last 20 years. We hypothesize that different 
mechanisms of conflict resolution lead to different rates of 
bargaining breakdown among electric power firms. Moreover, 
we hypothesize that the conflict resolution mechanism known 
as the Experts Panel, established by the 2004 Electricity Law 
has been successful in containing bargaining breakdowns 
compared to previous mechanisms, and this explains the 
reduction in the number of cases bought to the Experts Panel. 
 
This paper is organized into six sections. Section II presents an 
overview and theoretical analysis of conflict management in 
the electricity sector. Section III is devoted to the evolution of 
conflict resolution mechanisms in the Chilean electricity 
sector. Section IV presents a methodological approach to 
model behavior of conflicts in the electricity sector. In Section 
V the application of the proposed framework to the Chilean 
sector is presented. Finally Section VI presents the 
conclusions and proposals for future work.     
II.  RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 
Over the last 15 years, more than 200 infrastructure regulatory 
entities have been created in various countries in all 
continents. During the 1980s and early 1990s, in the OECD 
countries and Latin America, these entities were primarily 
responsible for the telecommunications sector. Over the last 
5–10 years, the number of regulators has greatly increased, 
and there has been a spread of regulatory institutions to other 
infrastructure industries (particularly electricity, energy, and, 
to a lesser extent, water and transport) and to other countries, 
including a number of countries in Africa [5]. Moreover, much 
of the experience and discussion of regulation in other fields is 
applicable to the electricity sector. 
 
A first important aspect of the new regulatory entities is their 
relationship to the government. In particular, many agencies 
established since 1990 have been ministry regulators. Some of 
these institutions were autonomous, but had narrow decision-
making power; for instance, many have limited, if any, power 
to regulate retail prices to consumers. Moreover, many 
ministry regulators now operate subject to duties defined in 
regulatory law and this seems to affect both their behavior and 
the performance of the infrastructure industries that they 
regulate [6]. 
 
A.  Conflicts in Regulated Sectors 
 
Regulatory conflicts resulting from different interpretations of 
laws and by-laws by the market agents are common in the 
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electricity sector. Typically, they involve disputes between the 
government authorities or regulators and the companies, in 
topics such as tariff reviews, the awarding of concessions and 
permits, the enforcement of service obligations or of 
compensation for past investment. They may also entail 
conflicts among the regulated companies themselves or 
between these companies and users, for instance, in issues  
related to interconnection charges, transmission fees or service 
standards [7]. 
 
The mechanisms used to solve regulatory conflicts are a key 
element in a regulatory regime and a major determinant of the 
regulatory risks borne by private investors. A common 
assumption is that a government official or, ideally, an 
independent regulator, will make the right decisions, guided 
by the desire to promote social welfare or by provisions stated 
in the law or in the regulatory contracts. Improvements can be 
made on this model by allowing the affected party to request a 
review of regulatory decisions, by establishing rules of due 
process and by creating norms aiming at the independence and 
accountability of regulators. However, if the objectivity of the 
all-powerful regulator is not guaranteed, either by its past 
reputation or by the written codes, regulatory risks are likely 
to remain high and sector performance to be poor [7]. 
 
B.  Theoretical Framework 
 
Our hypothesis is that conflicts arise from a breakdown of a 
bargaining process between parties. Thus, we begin by analy-
zing the canonical bargaining model, with two participating 
agents. 
 
i. Bargaining model 
 
Nash [8] was the first to define a bargaining problem and a 
solution satisfying four reasonable properties: i) Pareto 
efficiency, ii) a symmetric bargaining problem has a 
symmetric solution, iii) the solution changes linearly with 
linear transformations of the feasible set, and iv) Independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, i.e., adding feasible points that are 
worse than the solution does not alter the solution. Formally, 
for the case of two bargaining agents, the problem is 
characterized by couple (X, d), where X is a convex subset of 
R
2 
and d is a point in X representing the ‘status quo’ if the 
players disagree and cannot reach an agreement [13]. 
 
A bargaining solution S is defined as  
 
F : (X, d) → S, 
 
where X ⊆ R
2
 and S, d ∈ R
2
. X represents the utilities of the 
players in the set of feasible bargaining agreements.  
 
More generally, if we dispense with assumption ii) of 
symmetry, we may assume that the solution is influenced by 
the relative bargaining ability of each party, given by a 
parameter 0 < α; 1–α < 1. One interpretation of bargaining 
ability is that it represents the time preference (higher time 
preference implies a desire to settle quickly and weakens the 
negotiating ability of the firm), but it could also represent 
economic advantage or any other type of advantage in the 
negotiation. Note that the solution will depend on the relative 
bargaining powers of the two parties, which is usually 
unrelated to the legal merits of the case.  
 
For the case of two agents dividing a sum which (for 
simplicity) we normalize to 1, Nash showed that the unique 
solution (outcome O) to the problem satisfying conditions i), 
iii) and iv) is [13]: 
 




                          (1) 
0<u1+u2<1 
where 
α: ability or  bargaining  power of agent one, 
di:  utility for agent i representing the utility if the  
      agents disagree, i.e., the utility under the judicial solution. 
ui:  utility of agent i. 
 
The solution is fairly simple, and by assumption, leads to an 
efficient division of the surplus (over the disagreement point). 
In this simple setting there is no breakdown of negotiation.  
 
In certain bargaining games, one party has an outside option. 
Assume that the weaker party, (say u1 << ½ in (1)) has the 
possibility of abandoning the bargaining game and receiving a 
value of O.  If the solution to the bargaining problem without 
the outside option is u1 < O, the party chooses the outside 
option. The solution to this reformulated bargaining problem 
is for the other party to offer the maximum between the 
solution to the bargaining problem without an outside option 
(1) and O. In this case, again, there is no breakdown, and the 
bargaining solution is efficient: the only effect of the outside 
option is to improve the prospects of the first party in the 
negotiation [9]. 
 
In order to have a breakdown of the negotiation, there must be 
an essential failure due to the incompatibility of each party’s 
information. As shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite in a 
very general bargaining setting [10], if there is uncertainty 
about what each firm expects to be able to receive (its ‘value’) 
in the bargaining game, and moreover, the ranges of these 
values overlap, there is scope for a breakdown of bargaining, 




Once we have the possibility of breakdown in the bargaining 
process among firms, we have to consider how the electricity 
sector deals with the resulting conflicts or disputes. 
 
 
A variety of procedures can be used to resolve disputes and 
avoid court litigation and renegotiation of contracts. They 
include, among others, arbitration, mediation, mini-trial, 
private judging, neutral expert fact finding, and final offer 
                                                           
2  More precisely, there is no efficient solution that satisfies incentive 




arbitration. Table I summarizes the most common dispute 
resolution processes [11]:  
 
TABLE I 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
 
Mechanism  Description 
egotiation: 
 
A discussion among two or more agents with the 
goal of reaching an agreement. 
Mediation: 
 
A voluntary and confidential process in which a 
neutral third-party facilitator helps agents 
discuss difficult issues and helps negotiate an 
agreement. Basic steps in the process include 
gathering information, framing the issues, 
developing options, negotiating, and formalizing 
agreements. Parties in mediation create their 
own solutions and the mediator does not have 
any decision-making power over the outcome. 
Conciliation: 
 
A process whereby the parties to a dispute agree 
to utilize the services of a conciliator, who then 
meets with the parties separately in an attempt to 
resolve their differences. 
Arbitration: 
 
A process in which a neutral third party, after 
reviewing the evidence and listening to 
arguments from both sides, issues a decision that 
settles the case.  
 
Arbitration, the usual approach to solving differences in the 
industry, can be further subdivided in more specific types. 
 
ii. Types of Arbitration 
 
In this case a neutral third-party issues a decision to settle the 
dispute. For instance, it is possible to use the judiciary system, 
on the basis of the provisions of commercial, administrative or 




Although this is a widespread solution, it is seldom adequate 
when the regulatory conflicts are technically complex. This is 
the case of the electricity sector, where technical and 
economical decisions are strongly coupled. This is especially 
valid in emerging countries with no specialized judges, lack of 
independence of the courts or inefficient and extremely long 




In this type of arbitration, the mediator imposes a binding 
decision on the parties, and is free to choose any solution that 
is compatible with the norms and regulations of the sector and 
the general legislation. It tends to reach intermediate solutions 
between the positions of the parties in dispute. See for 
example, Montero [12]. 
 
Final offer arbitration 
 
In this type of arbitration, the mediator imposes a binding 
decision on the parties and is only allowed to choose between 
the final offers made by each party during the mediation. The 
arbitrator does not have the authority to choose an 
intermediate position. The choice of the arbitrator under this 
arrangement is limited [12]. 
 
Final offer arbitration encourages the parties to make 
reasonable offers, because if party A makes an unreasonable 
offer, there is a risk that the arbitrator will find party B’s last 
offer to be more reasonable, even though it is not an optimal 
choice, and therefore impose party B’s proposal as the binding 
decision. See Montero [12] for a criticism in the case of 
disputes in more than one dimension. 
 
III.  EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN 
THE CHILEAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
A.  Historical Overview 
 
Using the theoretical framework described previously, there 
have been three different conflict resolution mechanisms in 
the Chilean electricity sector in the more than 20 years since it 
began operating as a competitive market (see Table II).  
 
TABLE II 
EVOLUTION OF MECHANISM IN CHILEAN CASE 
 





























The mechanisms are explained in further detail in the 
following subsections.  
B.  Courts of Justice: Arbitration  
 
In this period there was no explicit procedure to resolve 
differences between firms, so they would bargain in the 
absence of an outside option within the electric sector.
 
The 
firms in dispute had the possibility of going to the ordinary 
courts of justice, but given the complexity of the issues and 
the delays of the justice system, it was not a real option in 
most cases
3




C.  Experts Committee: After the Reglamento Eléctrico and 
before the Experts Panel.  
 
The Reglamento Eléctrico of 1987 was the first bylaw after 
the initial law setting up competition in the market in 1981. It   
                                                           
3 Possibly incorrect and slow outcomes were expected from the judicial 
system given the lack of specialized knowledge. 
4 
 
helped to clarify several issues subject to interpretation 
(concessions, system security, power quality, open access 
scheme to the main transmission system, price model). It also 
introduced a new procedure to resolve disputes. Once a 
conflict arose among market agents (working in coordination 
with the market/system operator) and if they could not reach 
an agreement, the issue was presented to an Experts 
Committee
4
, independent of the firms. Their decisions were 
not binding, but were recommendations or advice for the 
market agents (it acted as a mediator). If a firm was 
dissatisfied with the proposal, it could appeal to the regulator 
(Comisión 2acional de Energía, C2E) which would issue a 
report and recommendation to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. The Ministry not only had final decision power, but 
could also alter the regulations that related to the specific 
issue, by reinterpretation of the electrical legislation. 
 
Usually, this last stage might take several months or years for 
the regulator to reach a decision. Moreover, these decisions 
could be overturned by lobbying or by reintroducing the 
original issue in a slightly modified way, given the double role 
of the regulator as adjudicator and as the originator of 
regulation. In this way, issues could remain undecided for 
years, as the regulator changed its mind in accordance with 
new arguments. A final consideration is that since few human 
capital resources were devoted to solving conflicts, the 
decisions were not always correct within the legal framework 
or under the logic of the electrical system, in those cases in 
which the issue had not been regulated before.  
 
From the point of view of a firm with a weak legal argument, 
appealing to the Committee of Experts could delay an 
unfavorable decision, considering the appeals process, or even 
change it in its favor
5
. The uncertainty about the outcome of 
the process led to breakdowns of the bargaining process and 
hence to an increasing number of disputes that had to be 
settled by the regulator. 
 
D.  Experts Panel 
 
The Electricity Law of 2004, or “Ley Corta”, introduced a 
new mechanism for conflict resolution, namely, the Experts 
Panel, given the unsatisfactory results of the previous 
approach. The Experts Panel has several important differences 
with the previous approach to disputes. First, it is an 
independent organism, both administratively and 
economically. It is composed of members with proven 
expertise in the field, and the Panel acts very quickly, with 
final adjudication within 30 working days. Second, it can only 
choose among the alternatives presented by the market agents, 
and cannot select intermediate positions
6
. The Panel decides 
on the basis of the stronger of the two arguments, because 
                                                           
4 Composed by one lawyer and two engineers or economists. 
5 From the point of view of the CEO of a company, this may also delay the 
recognition of a loss in the balance sheet. 
6 Except in exceptional cases, determined in the bylaw “Reglamento del 
Panel de Expertos”.  
 
usually there are reasonable arguments for both sides. The 
reasoning used to reach the decision must be included in the 
report. The Panel decisions are final and binding on the parties 
[15]. The following points describe additional features of the 
Experts Panel as a body for conflict resolution [16]. 
 
i. Independence of the members 
 
Strict ineligibilities apply to ensure that members are not 
affiliated in any way with the government or electric sector 
companies. Members cannot own shares in electric sector 
companies. Panel members are subject to integrity rules 
defined in the administrative and penal law and cannot 
intervene in disputes related with topics in which they were 
directly involved before becoming members. 
 
ii. Time constraints 
 
The short deadlines for decisions of the Experts Panel are 
designed to avoid regulatory uncertainty in the sector, which 
can involve large financial commitments for firms. Moreover, 
it seeks to discourage strategic use of the conflict resolution 
mechanism in order to delay reporting an adverse result. 
However, a disadvantage inherent to short deadlines is the 
possible decline in the quality of decisions. This can be a 
problem if there are a large number of simultaneous disputes. 
 
iii. Reasoned decisions 
 
The verdict of the Experts Panel must include the arguments 
and reasoning used to reach the decision. The judgment is 
strictly limited to the matters under discussion. The final 
report as well as all the background information and the 
minutes of the sessions are made publicly available.  
 
iv. Binding resolutions  
 
The final decision of the Experts Panel is binding on all 
participants. They can be no appeals to the decision, either of a 
jurisdictionary, administrative o ordinary nature. This implies 
that companies are aware that a disagreement creates a 
precedent because the verdict of the Panel cannot be appealed 
and they will have to comply with the resolution of the Panel. 
 
These features show that the Experts Panel does not replace 
the regulator, and that it is restricted to applying the current 
regulatory framework. 
 
E.  Flow Diagram  
 
The bylaws of the Experts Panel regulate the submission 
process for conflicts among agents. The procedure 
incorporates several instances to help reach an agreement 
among the parties, before submitting a divergence to the 
Panel. In our interpretation, this is the bargaining stage, 
whereas an appeal to the Expert’s Panel represents a 
breakdown. At this stage, the participants provide the Panel 
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with the documents that allow the Experts Panel to identify the 
specific matters involved in the conflict. 
 
The flow diagram in Figure 1 shows the general mechanism 
for the treatment of a conflict in the market (market agents or 
companies C1, C2, .., Cn). 
 
The companies can follow two options to resolve their 
conflicts. First, the companies can avoid the Experts Panel if 
they reach an agreement (possibly after a bargaining process). 
The final result of this bargaining procedure is formalized by 
the market operator (in Chile the Economic Load Dispatch 
Center or CDEC in the Figure 1) which requires unanimity in 
the vote for approval of the agreement. 
 
In the case where no agreement can be reached, the conflict is 
submitted to the Experts Panel, i.e., the bargaining process 
among firms breaks down. The companies that are in conflict, 
as well as the CDEC, develop the arguments that sustain their 
positions. Fifteen days after the discrepancy has been formally 
declared in the CDEC, the Panel receives the arguments and 
the different stances of the participants as well as the 
background information showing the origin of the conflict 
(transcription of the voting session in the CDEC).  
 
Fig. 1. Flow diagram for modeling the behavior of the agents. 
 
The Panel uses this information as well as other relevant 
information to analyze and reach a decision within 30 working 
days. This stage involves a public hearing where all parties 
and interested institutions can voice their arguments and 
positions. Members of the Panel can question the 
representatives of the differing positions in order to 
understand specific points of the conflict. The final decision, 
binding on all the participants, becomes public after thirty 
working days have elapsed. 
IV.  PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 
In what follows, we try to explain the behavior of the agents 
under these different approaches to conflict resolution. 
 
A.  Courts of Justice: Arbitration before 1997 
 
In this period, the only option for firms in case of a 
disagreement that could not be resolved through bargaining 
was to appeal to the judicial system. Given the uncertainty 
about the outcome, the long delays before decisions as well as 
the cost of judicial procedures, firms preferred to solve their 
problems by negotiating agreements, i.e., by bargaining. As 





However, due to the differences in bargaining power between 
firms (α >> ½), the outcomes were perceived to be unfair and 
sometimes even in violation of sector regulation. This led to 
calls for its replacement by a system which allowed appealing 
to the regulatory authority if a firm felt the outcome was unfair 
or that it violated the laws and bylaws of the sector. 
 
B.  Experts Committee: After the Reglamento Eléctrico and 
before the Experts Panel. 
 
In this period, a firm that was dissatisfied with the results of 
the bargaining process within the CDEC could appeal to the 
CNE. After a fairly long period (and going through the 
mediation of the Experts Committee, see Section III.C), the 
CNE would send a recommendation to the Economics 
Secretary, who would issue a decree. The whole process was 
slow and could be overturned by appeals by rival firms 
presenting other divergences with slightly changed conditions. 
Moreover, there was a tendency to look for intermediate 
solutions.  
 
In our analysis, to a first approximation, we assume that a 
divergence, which implies going first to the Experts 
Committee, and then to the CNE, provides an outside option 
to the weaker party (i.e. with u1 << 1/2) with a value of O. 
Thus if the solution to the bargaining problem without the 
outside option is u1 < O, firm 1 can appeal to the CNE, 
obtaining a payoff of O. The solution to this bargaining 
problem is for firm 2 to offer the maximum between the 
solution of the bargaining problem without an outside option, 
i.e. the maximum between the solution to (1) to firm 1 and O.
8
 
The advantage is that this solution avoids the cost and delay of 
going to the CNE, i.e. it is efficient. If this were the applicable 
                                                           
7 One of the firms represented more than 55% of the generating capacity, 
and it owned the main transmission system. 
8 Note that the value of the outside option should include the cost of using 
the option. In particular, the slowness of the process meant that the firm with 
the weaker legal position could delay including the results of the bargaining 
process in its balance sheet. This implies that from the point of view of the 
firm’s management, the delay reduced the cost of the outside option, making it 
relatively more attractive.  
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model, there would never be an appeal to the CNE, contrary to 
the observation of many cases of breakdown. 
 
In order to get a breakdown of the bargaining game, it is 
necessary that the positions of the two firms are incompatible. 
Assume now that firm 2 believes its outside option is worth O 
+ ε2, while firm 1 believes that it is only worth O – ε1. 
Assume now that the solution without an outside option lies 
between the estimates of the outside option by the firms, i.e., 
u1 ∈  [O − ε1, O + ε2]. Then firm 1 will make the offer u1, 
which she believes firm 2 should accept, but this is below firm 
1’s belief of the value of its outside option, so it prefers to go 
to the CNE (if the difference between firm 2’s estimate of the 
outside option and u1 is larger than the cost of appealing to the 
CNE). Note that firm 2 cannot believe in announcements of 
firm 1 that its true outside option is O − ε1 (an announcement 
of this value by firm 1 is considered cheap talk and not 
credible by firm 2), since firm 1’s only credible action is to 
appeal to the CNE, and thus to have a breakdown of the 
negotiation process. Hence we have a model of breakdown 
that seems to explain the numerous appeals to the CNE, 
reflecting a failure of the bargaining process due to uncertainty 
about the value of the outside option, i.e., the result in case of 
disagreement. 
 
C.  Experts Panel 
 
The most recent stage of conflict resolution in Chile 
corresponds to the Experts Panel. It has led to a marked 
reduction in the number of disputes (see Figure 3) that are not 
solved by bargaining between firms, but lead to the 
intervention of the Panel, i.e., breakdowns. We propose that 
the explanation lies in the fact that the Panel increases the 
cost, or alternatively, reduces the benefits of the outside option 
to the firm with the weaker legal position, while 
simultaneously lowering the uncertainty about the outcome. 
Hence the likelihood of breakdowns (disputes that arrive at the 
Experts Panel) in the bargaining process is reduced. To see 
this, it is important to consider that most of the disputes 
among power generating firms concern the division of the 
capacity payment
9
. The capacity payment rewards firms for 
being able to provide active power to serve maximum demand 
(as well as to provide some ancillary services), and is a fixed 
global amount (paid by users) that must be divided among 
firms. Any increase in the payment to one firm implies a loss 
to another firm, so the interests of the firms are totally 
opposed. Other disputes taken to the Panel also represent 
division of costs, and correspond to situations in which firms 
have totally opposed interests, in the sense that one firm’s gain 
implies a loss to the other firm.  
 
Consider the case of two firms that have a conflict regarding 
                                                           
9 There have been a few conflicts regarding the appropriate marginal cost 
to use in valuing transaction under very unusual circumstances, but these are 
due to the exceptional circumstances of 2008, which combined an initial dry 
season, the failure of a major generating plant and the low initial state of 
reservoirs and high demand.  
the division of the capacity payment.
10
 We can model this as a 
bargaining problem, where two firms must split the capacity 
payment, and the threat-point is to receive no payment. As 
described in section II.B.1, the solution to the bargaining 
problem depends on the relative power of the firms, which in 
turn is related to the ability to wait out – the ability to resist a 
delay in the capacity payment– [16].  
 
Under the conditions of the Expert Panel, the outside option 
for the firm with the weaker legal argument is lower than 
previously. First, because the process is short, so there is no 
benefit for management of the firm with the weaker position 
to attempt to delay recognizing a loss in the balance sheet. 
Second, because an application to the Panel amplifies the 
effect of a loss, by increasing the probability of getting 
nothing, due to the use of final offer arbitration. Second, the 
probability of breakdown is reduced, because there is less 
uncertainty about the final outcome when taking the dispute to 
the Experts Panel. The combination of increased costs and 
reduced uncertainty lowers the attraction of a breakdown in 
negotiation. 
 
Initially, when the Experts Panel was introduced, there were 
many breakdowns, i.e., cases before the Panel, but the number 
of cases fell rapidly in succeeding years (see Figure 3). We 
model this evolution by assuming that there exists a function 
 that describes the known probability of the Panel giving 
support to firm 1 as a function of the strength of its legal 
arguments, relative to those of firm 2, parameterized by z ∈ 




That is, if the evidence is weak (z < µ1), firm 1 is sure to lose 
the case (O = 0) in the Panel. If the evidence is strong (z > µ2), 
it is sure to win, O = 1 in the Panel. Finally, in intermediate 
cases, there is a probability, increasing in z, that it receives 
value O = 1 if it appeals to the Panel. Assume that firms have 
continuously updated expectations of µi, given by past 
experience, and that µ1 is increasing and µ2 is decreasing over 
time.
11
 Assume also that there is a cost 0 < cB < 1 to both firms 
from appealing to the Panel, given by lawyers cost, 
preparation time, etc. 
 
In this setting, the value of the outside option in the range [0, 
µ1] is known to both firms to be O1 = 1 – cB, O2 = – cB. Hence 
firm 2 will accept any offer greater than zero, and not go to the 
Panel when its legal arguments lie in that range. An analogous 
argument applies in the range [µ2, 1] for firm 1. Hence, only in 
the cases in which the strength of the legal arguments of both 
                                                           
10 We will assume two firms, though in general the conflict involved more 
firms. However, this assumption simplifies matters and also is consistent with 
the fact that in most (but not all) cases there were basically two opposed 
positions. 
11 This means that, over time, the firms observe that the decisions of the 
Experts Panel become more precise.   
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firms lie in the range [µ1, µ2] is there scope for appeals to the 
Experts Panel, if the beliefs of the firms about the relative 
strength of their arguments are such that they lead to a 
breakdown, as in section IV.B. Assuming that the Experts 
Panel provides good decisions (i.e., favoring the firm with the 
stronger legal argument), over time firms will update their 
perceptions of the thresholds, with µ1 ↑, µ2 ↓, and therefore 
there is a smaller interval of uncertainty, implying that fewer 
cases will be brought to the Panel. Within the interval, cases 
would still be brought to the Panel, but these will become 
cases in which it is more difficult to make a decision, since 
both positions will have strong arguments. Note that with an 
erratic Panel, the interval [µ1, µ2] would not decrease over 
time and the number of cases would not change. 
V.  APPLICATION TO THE CHILEAN SECTOR 
This section presents an application of this framework to the 
Chilean sector, during the periods of the   Experts Committee 
and the Experts Panel. Unfortunately, the small number of 
observation (years) does not allow the use of conventional 
statistical analysis.    
 
Before the Experts Panel, the methodology analyzed in 
Section IV.B predicts a large number of discrepancies 
presented to the CNE, because the uncertainty about the 
ultimate resolution of the regulator led to breakdowns. Figure 
2 shows the number of conflicts presented and resolved before 
the Experts Panel. During this period, an average of 16 
conflicts per year were presented to the regulator. It can be 
also be observed that the number of conflicts that were 
decided was significantly smaller than the number of conflicts. 
This confirms that for the regulator the procedure took a long 
time to reach a decision and that there was a stock of 
undecided cases by the time the law was changed and the 









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
# conflicts # resolved conflicts
 
Fig 2. Number of conflicts per year before the Experts Panel. 
 
On the other hand, since the creation of the Experts Panel it 
has decided 30 disputes involving generation companies 
within the CDECs, an average of 6 conflicts per year. This 
number corresponds to a decline in 66 % in relation to the 
previous period. Moreover, after the first two years in which 
the stock of disputes corresponding to the previous period was 
resolved, the number of these conflicts has never been above 
6. 
 
Table III describes the number of conflicts per year among 
generation companies and the number of issues involved in the 
conflicts. Figure 3 shows the decrease in the number of 
disputes presented to the Experts Panel [16]. Note also that 
because there are no more than 30 days between the 
presentation of the issue and the decision of the Panel, the 
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Fig. 3 Number of conflicts and issues in the Experts Panel. 
 
TABLE III 









2004 12 17 
2005 6 6 
2006 3 3 
2007 4 6 
2008 6 6 
 
The observed evolution was anticipated by the methodology 
presented in Section IV.C. It is noteworthy that during this 
period there were serious supply problems (interruption of gas 
supplies from Argentina, large increase in fuel prices, low 
levels in hydro reservoirs) which led to exceptionally high 
marginal costs, but which were accommodated without an 
increase in the number of disputes.  
 
In order to explore in more detail the evolution of this process 
during the Experts Panel period, we present a descriptive 
analysis in the following paragraphs. 
 
In the first place, the conflicts are classified in figure 4 on the 
basis of whether the key issue was of a technical or legal 
nature. According to this analysis, disputes of a technical 
character were prominent in the first period, from 2004 to 
2005. Since 2006, legal issues have been key, due to 
incorporation of new bylaws required by the Electricity Law 
of 2004. The increase in bylaws may be the reason for the 
increase in the number of legal conflicts, due to the 
uncertainty about the interpretation of the new bylaws by 
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Fig 4.  Key issues in conflicts/year indicator. 
 
Figure 5, Who presents the discrepancy?, shows the frequency 
of use by different companies of the dispute settlement 
system, while Figure 6 shows, for the same agents, the 
percentage of positive results (winning position) achieved in 
the conflict. 
 
It is important to note that the origin of the discrepancies that 
arrive at the Experts Panel are concentrated: three firms which 
originate 50% of the conflicts. However the distribution of 
market agents whose positions were supported by the Experts 
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Fig.6. Percentage of positive outcomes of each agent.  
 
It is noteworthy that many disputes that arrive at the Experts 
Panel are presented by hydro power companies. Possible 
explanations are that there is substantial uncertainty about the 
capacity in the case of reservoir-based generation than can be 
depleted in a dry year, which would lead to breakdowns of the 
bargaining process of dividing the capacity payment. 
Moreover, hydro power companies are major users of the 
main transmission system, a common source of conflicts. 
 
It is important to note that the positions of the CDEC 
(market/system operator) were supported by the Experts Panel 
in close to 25% of the cases, and that the positions of company 
C8 won in 15% of the cases. The remaining cases are widely 
distributed. It can be concluded that the most convincing  
arguments are not necessarily associated to the agents who 
present the discrepancies. 
  
Figure 7, Type of decision of the Experts Panel, classifies 
decisions of the Panel according to the votes of Panel 
members. They are divided among those that are unanimous, 
those that are decided by a majority of members, and also 
those that contain additional observations (preventions) by at 







without Unanimity Unanimity Prevention without Prevention
 
Fig. 7. Type of decision of the Experts Panel. 
 
It can be observed that in nearly all conflicts the final decision 
was approved by consensus and without any observations by 
individual members. The reason for the consensus appears to 
be due to the process by which the Experts Panel arrives at 
decisions, with many rounds of discussions of the issues at 
stake, until a consensus usually appears. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper proposes a model for the analysis of conflict 
resolution mechanisms in the electric sector, based on the 
Chilean experience in the last 20 years of market operation. 
The different periods are described and analyzed, focusing in 
the last period, which follows the introduction of the Experts 
Panel institution since year 2004. 
 
The proposed models, based on Nash bargaining theory, are 
consistent with the historical experience of the Chilean 
electricity sector. During the 4 years of operation of the 
Experts Panel, the number of conflicts presented to the Panel 
has decreased, as well as in comparison to the number of 
conflicts under the previous procedure.  
 
The work constitutes a first step in the formal study of conflict 
resolution mechanisms in power markets. Further research is 
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proposed for a more detailed modeling of agents behavior and 
their relationship with the market design performance.  
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